The Ideology of Pakistan….ambivalent, dynamic, evolving

• October 23, 2020
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Javed Jabbar | June-September, 2020 | Published in Scholarly Journal Criterion Quarterly.

 

September 30, 2020/0 Comments/in Articles, Beliefs, Capitalist, Dogma, Equality, Fraternity, History, Ideas, Ideology, Islam, Islamization, Liberty, Nationalism, Pakistan, Progress, Radical, Religion, Socialist, Theory, Vol 15 No. 3 / Javed Jabbar*

 

*The writer is a former Senator and Federal Minister; author of, among other books: “Pakistan — unique origins; unique destiny?” and “What is Pakistaniat?”. www.javedjabbar.net.

 

 

Abstract

(In this paper the author traces and analysis the evolutionary journey of the ideology of Pakistan which is “a true work-in-progress.” – Editor)

 

Let us commence with definitions of the term “ideology”. The plural is deliberately used. Like beauty, ideology often lies in the eye of the beholder. Or the formulator. Or its user. Or its adaptor. Or its practitioner. The multiplicity is inevitable. Which should not deter us from noting a few definitions that illustrate the range of approaches to the word.

 

Historian E. H. Erikson writes: “(Ideology)… is an unconscious tendency underlying religion and scientific as well as political thought: the tendency at a given time to make facts amenable to ideas, and ideas to facts, in order to create a world image convincing enough to support the collective and individual sense of identity.”1

 

Yugoslavian philosopher Mihailo Markovic explains: “Ideology is… the ensemble of ideas and theories with which a class expresses  its interests, its aims and the norms of its activity.”2 After citing both  of them, South Asian analyst, Asghar Ali Engineer, summarizes: “Whereas science establishes what is, ideology establishes what ought to be.”3 Scholar Dr. Fazlur Rahman in referring to religious orthodoxy as a prime source of Islamic ideology, writes: “Islamic orthodoxy…is characterized by an indistinguishable blend of reinvigorated fundamentalism and progressivism; it develops not by self-propulsion, so to say, but by watching, adjusting and absorbing within itself that which moves within it.”4

 

With specific reference to ideologies in the Middle East and Pakistan, as studied by them up to about 1987, Fred Halliday and Hamza Alavi observe: “…ideologies denote sets of beliefs concerning social and political issues… which purport to explain why the world    is as it is, how it came to be so, and what the goals of political action should be”. They further state that, in developing societies, “… ideologies have an enhanced role as the articulators of uncertainty and of contesting demands, both internally and internationally, as well as serving to instill acceptance of new and apparently arbitrary political entities.”5

 

Two definitions of ideology in the Oxford English Dictionary are: “A system of ideas and ideals, specially one which forms the basis of economic or political theory and practice.” And: “The ideas and manner of thinking of a group, social class, or individual.”6

 

From psychology to history, from theology to economics, from facts to myths – past, present, future – ideologies embrace them all. In turn, ideologies are changed by the embrace.

 

Every nation-state has an ideology. It may not be formally termed an “ideology” in every case. In the form of a Constitution, or by a declaration, or through laws, judicial verdicts, even unwritten yet accepted conventions, together or individually, a set of principles and parameters serve as the defining portrait of a country, its heritage and its hopes. In many cases, ideologies are partly or wholly derived from religions, as the major belief-systems of humanity. This is true even of states that stress their secular, non-religion-oriented character. Icons as well as ideas about faith are adapted or absorbed into texts, flags, ceremonies, phrases: in subliminal yet unmistakable ways, religion is a prime source for the charters of states. The cross has been widely used in modified form as the leitmotif for the flags of major western, ostensibly secular but pre-dominantly Christian countries. The crescent appears on the flags of several Muslim nations.

 

In recent decades, in some western countries, in sections of academia and public discourse, the concepts of ideology and nationalism have come to be regarded with scepticism, and often with outright hostility. As a fall-out from the causes and consequences of World War II and the Cold War, the destructive excesses of Fascism, National Socialism and Communism in the Soviet Union and China, and now in a post- Communist Russia, and the rise of an ugly populism, ideology and nationalism are seen as potentially sinister threats to individual liberty and democracy. We should guard against succumbing to this view, while remaining vigilant against chauvinistic forms of national assertion. Self-centered individual liberty and systemically flawed democracy, in turn, themselves threaten cohesion and stability of nation-states that are capable of using ideology to mobilize energy for constructive goals and to focus on human advancement.

 

Ideologies have categories:

A categorization of ideologies is also relevant before we address the specific question of the ideology of Pakistan. In this writer’s view, there are five broad types. First: Theological ideologies, based on, and driven by religious beliefs. With such beliefs being interpreted     or practiced in diverse ways by adherents and sects of the same faith. Zionism and Israel are examples. Second: Sociological ideologies, shaped by territory, ethnicity, cultural chemistry. Switzerland ‘s sense of Swiss singularity while containing treble internal diversity: German, French, Italian. And on the other hand, Bangladesh with dominant internal homogeneity. These are contrasting, yet illustrative in a shared category. Third: Economic ideologies: Socialist, Communist, Capitalist.  Phases of Scandinavian eras, former USSR, China, USA are pertinent. Fourth: Liberationist ideologies. As in Algeria, Vietnam, South Africa. Fifth: Hybrid ideologies. Comprising one or more features from the other four. Pakistan is a prime example, shaped by parts – but not wholly – of the first category, and certainly by parts of the others. Other examples abound where there is overlap between the five niches.

 

Some changes are inevitable:

All ideologies change with time and with the experience of conditions created by forces beyond the control of a particular ideology’s proponents. They also change due to conditions resulting from the ideologists’ own actions while implementing a particular perspective. The French Revolution’ s ideology changed in less than two decades. It began by dethroning a monarchy and then saw the people applaud Napoleon as he crowned himself emperor. It then took another 150 years for that revolutionary ideology’s theme of “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity” to be applied to women. Only as recently as 1944 were French women given the right to vote. Chinese Communism is another example of ideological re-modelling. The political dimension in 2020 retains a single party’s dominant control of the state for over the past 70 years even as the economic dimension over the past 40 years began to use strands of capitalism to redress the damaging impact of earlier applications of Communist economic doctrine.

 

Pakistan – a work-in-progress:

Perhaps more than others, the ideology of Pakistan is a true work-in- progress – from ancient times to the contemporary era. The work began even before the invention of the word in 1933 for the country’s name and before the formal locationing of the new state took place. At least four principal factors shape its evolution: history, territory, deterrence, and co-existence. Part of the process possibly began a millennium ago and has continued into the next, even passing the creation of Pakistan in 1947 as a major marker. But seeing that too as only one milestone on the path of a long journey.

 

To spot the start of the pre-1947 phase, one has to first decide which lens to choose.   Depending on whether one picks a telescope   or a microscope, the origins can be traced all the way back to over 1200 years ago when the first Muslim – most likely an Arab – stepped onto the soil of South Asia. Germinating and growing into a Muslim minority that ruled over a non-Muslim majority for about 600 years, that phase also saw clear separations within the broad brush of being Muslim. The large stream of persons shifting from Central Asia, Persia, Turkey and Arab regions into pivotal sectors of Court governance in South Asia maintained a deliberately separate, even arrogantly superior sense of themselves from those who became local Muslims after conversion to Islam.7 Though the latter category remained in a minority in the very areas where the immigrant Muslims helped Muslim rulers reign over the Hindu majority. Whereas the areas that eventually became parts of Pakistan saw conversions from Buddhism, Jainism and Hinduism in much larger numbers and in which the influx from elsewhere of foreign Muslims was far less. Despite differing origins and attitudes, the two streams came to share a broad affinity. The emancipatory nature of Islam that transcended castes and the peaceful, pluralist values of Sufism enabled two phenomena. One: steady, stable spread of the faith in South Asia. Two: acceptance of Muslim rulers by a majority of non-Muslims.

 

The territorial dimension:

In the context of the second factor, that of territory, the telescope reaches far beyond one or two Millenia of the Muslim advents into South Asia. A study of about 4473 years by scholar Ahmed Abdulla, commences from 2500 B.C to reach about the mid-1970s.8 It reveals interesting details. For as many as 3700 years there existed a striking autonomy and separateness of the whole area that presently constitutes Pakistan from the South Asian region ruled from Delhi or Agra or elsewhere. Though the Indus Valley civilization is generally construed to be part of what lay to its east, archaeological records show that the civilization inter- acted with centres of trade far to the west such as Ur in Iraq. From early Aryan times, Brahmins to the east of what is now Pakistan viewed the region west of the Sutlej River as “maleech” (impure) and shunned it. For only about 700 years did Delhi/Calcutta/Agra-based rule completely control all parts of the land that is today’s Pakistan. About 100 years of the Mauryan (Buddhist) period (300-200 B.C), about 512 years of the Muslim slave dynasties and the Mughal period (1227-1739 AD), about 90 years of British rule (1857-1947).

 

For all the other parts of the Millenia, either local sovereigns, or systems of power based to the northwest or west of Pakistan governed the area. After the Indus Valley eras, the advent of the Aryans, the later incursion of Alexander, there came the ages of the Graeco-Bactrian, Saka-Parthian, Kushan and the White Huns. With the first of the Muslim invasions of the Ghaznavids, the Ghorid and Qubacha periods, the Nadir Shah and Abdali phases and the Sikh period continued to mark the land that is now Pakistan from north- and-east-centred control. Thus, the territorial dimension of the ideology of Pakistan spans much of a contiguous timespan of about 5000 years.9

 

Last-minute pivotal moment:

If, however, we prefer a microscope, then, notwithstanding the long, historic movement towards maintaining Muslim distinctness, and even by-passing post-1857, we can  sharply narrow our  focus to that relatively brief yet tantalizing flash – the Cabinet Mission Plan –  which sparked, and  sputtered and was then suffocated by  the Congress and Nehru in 1946-1947.10 That was the dramatic phase in the evolutionary movement of the ideology of Pakistan when its proponents were willing to share space with a Congress  ideology that claimed secularism but was subtly, and sometimes visibly, parochially Hindu and exclusive. The Muslim League and Mr. Jinnah were ready to attempt a confederal structure that would encompass Muslim-majority areas and introduce a novel 3-zone system of component units that enabled both continuity of identity and co-existence with diversity. In a perverse way, rejection by the Congress Party of this inclusive concept vindicated the rationale and authenticity of the ideology of Pakistan.11

 

Identity affirmation:

This leads directly to the third factor, that of deterrence. The persistent tendency of the vastly larger Hindu majority to refuse acknowledging the reality of Muslim apprehensions obliged the development of a protectionist, pre-emptive conceptual framework. This became unavoidable when the Congress and its allies – as well as adversaries on the extreme Hindu fringe – refused to accept that Muslims represented more than the sum of their parts. They were not simply a conventional religious minority. Muslims clearly displayed the characteristics of being a distinct nation. A nation that was also numerically substantive. Though speaking multiple languages and, in some respects, practising contrasting lifestyles, the Muslims of South Asia possessed several fundamental commonalities – of faith, diet, customs, festivals, memories, aspirations. These set them apart from Hindus.12 Not as antagonists – but irreducibly separate and different. This facet was either willfully or inadvertently described as being “communal”. It was misrepresented by the Hindu-dominated Congress leadership and by the section of media that supported it as being schismatic at the ulterior behest of the British.13

 

The authenticity of Muslim anxiety to secure their social and economic rights received ironic endorsement from an unlikely source. The Communist Party of India and other Left factions volubly supported the demand for Pakistan. This fact alone invalidates the thesis advanced by some analysts to the effect that the Pakistan Movement was mainly driven by a Muslim feudal class and an urban Muslim “salariat” (professional-skilled) class that sought new opportunities free of Hindu domination for their own material benefits.

 

Awkwardly for the Muslim League, most of the established Muslim religious leadership vociferously opposed the concept of a separate Pakistan and its emerging ideology. But then they conducted a U-turn after August 1947 and postured as the custodians of the new country’s ideology. It is a testament to the extraordinary capacity of M.A Jinnah that he was able to successfully steer the movement by which about 70 million Muslims achieved a state of their own – in the face of deep, dual hostility from the Hindu-dominated Congress, and from many followers of the Muslim ulema.

 

An accurate indicator of the formidable variety of opinions which tried to impede the progress of the ideology of Pakistan or endorsed   it, is the enumeration made by Hamza Alavi in his essay: “Pakistan and Islam: Ethnicity and Ideology”. He identified the following eight ideological-political positions amongst Indian Muslims in the period prior to and in 1947. Five of these eight came under the specific head of “Muslim” positions in India, four of them titled with the pre- fix of “Islamic”. They were: 1. Islamic Traditionalism by the Deobandi ulema; and separately 2. Islamic Traditionalism by the Barelvi ulema and Pirs; 3. Islamic Fundamentalism by the Jamaat-i-Islami and Maulana Maududi; 4. Islamic Modernism as articulated by Sir Syed Ahmed Khan and Allama Iqbal; 5. Secular Muslim Nationalism exemplified by M.A. Jinnah. Under the head of “Non-communal positions of Muslims in Muslim majority provinces”. Three others were present: 6. Secular provincial non-communal transactional politics – Landlord-dominated right-wing Punjab Unionist Party and various political groups  in  Sind, being the ruling groups and parties; 7. Secular provincial non- communal radical politics – by the Krishak Proja Party of Bengal led by A.K. Fazlul Haq, the ruling party in Bengal; and lastly, 8. Secular non- communal “Nationalist Muslims” as in the ruling (Congress) Party in Sarhad. The supreme triumph of the ideology of Pakistan as its catalytic phase crystallized in 1947 and soon thereafter was that it brought together seven out of the above eight strands, with M.A. Jinnah’s own version leading this medley. For obvious reasons, the eighth strand, that of Congress Muslims, was not part of this assortment which supported the creation of Pakistan, early or later.14

 

Post-Independence crises:

In this context, during the initial phase, independence proved to be a mixed blessing. The fourth factor which formed the ideology of Pakistan, that of Co-existence – by Muslims possessing enormous diversity of ethnicity, languages, life-styles – was under severe stress from the word go.15 The new state commenced as the most disjointedly constructed nation-state in all of history, with two wings distant from each other by about 1000 miles of very unfriendly territory. Yet, the new citizens shared great enthusiasm and huge expectations. The country’s realities and events unfolded on two parallel tracks.    On one track, flood-lit by freedom, the harsh, hard facts of internal disparities, influxes and shifts of population, new competitive, conflictual forces exposing contradictions and counter-pressures. On the other, the overnight, spectacular creation of an unwieldy yet passionate new nation comprising, in turn, several sub-nations. People were empowered by the determination to survive. Beset with daunting challenges they summoned vibrant energy and a sense of enterprise    to overcome problems. For the first 18 years, up to 1965, the two tracks produced startling shocks. On one track there were the Bengali language controversy, the dismissal of the Jugto Front Government    in East Pakistan and others. On the other track there were pleasant surprises, e.g. a steady, productive rate of economic growth and expansion of infrastructure.16 But for the next 6 years after 1965 there took place a gradual derailment, till the rapid, bloodied unravelling to the end of 1971.

 

Adverse impacts:

During the country’s first 24 years, with 2 wings of territory, the specific aspects that adversely impacted the evolving ideology of Pakistan deserve listing. These were:

 

Indian belligerence manifested in numerous ways, including the illegal occupation of Jammu and Kashmir. West Pakistan’s domineering approach to East Pakistan evident in several respects, notwithstanding major progress achieved in the eastern wing post-1947. The insistence on adopting the Objectives Resolution in 1949 without amendments. This failure disregarded strong reservations expressed by all non-Muslim members of the Constituent Assembly. There were some pertinent features of the Resolution, but the views of non-Muslims deserved at least partial integration into the text.17 A gross over-estimation of religion-exploiting forces. This was reflected in retreat at every step  by the civil, non-religion-based political parties in the face of narrow orthodox demands by the ulema and religion-based parties. The tendency to be intimidated was evident in the decisions to add “Islamic” before “Republic” for the formal title of the state and in the mandatory provision in the 1956 Constitution that the President should be a Muslim. The imposition of One Unit in the western wing became an attempt to suppress historic regional, cultural and linguistic elements of identity. The abrogation of the 1956 Constitution, the enforcement of martial law in 1958, the transfer of power in March 1969 to the Army Chief instead of, as per the 1962 Constitution, to the Speaker of the National Assembly. The catastrophe of 1971 is well- known and requires no summary herein.

 

Onward of 16^th December 1971, dented but not vanquished, the ideology of Pakistan gradually recovered some coherence and cogency. The fact that Bangladesh began with, and has sustained its proudly, pre- dominantly Muslim identity over the next 50 years while recognizing other faiths has invigorated the original idea of Pakistan, far from demolishing it.18

 

Components of Pakistan’s ideology:

The ideology of Pakistan comprises several different sources, documents and practices. To date in 2020, there is no single document validated by the Legislatures and the Supreme Court titled: “The ideology of Pakistan”.

 

Individual references to the multiplicity of its components are necessary. To begin with: principles and values enshrined in the Holy Quran and the authenticated parts of the Sunnah. These portions find expression in different sections of the Constitutions of 1956, 1962 and 1973 and in numerous amendments in all three. One commonality running through them all is the concept that Islam is more than a conventional religion because it specifies individual rights alongside collective codes of conduct, be this for orphans and women’s property rights or for believers of other faiths. In the 1973 Constitution, the parts describing Fundamental Rights and Principles of Policy accurately mirror the ideals aimed for.19

 

In preceding parts of this essay, the four elements of History, Territory, Deterrence and Co-existence have already been stated. Historian K.K. Aziz identifies 170 landmarks from 1858 to 1940 to chart progress toward the idea of Pakistan.20 Several dozen individuals in their own personal ways articulated the emergence of the concept in the 19th century, most notably Sir Syed Ahmed Khan. K.K. Aziz’s survey does not begin with the territorial long view already presented in this essay.

 

Another constituent of ideology is the Two-Nation Theory. This was well-articulated, with certain variations but with a basic common theme by Allama Iqbal, Chaudhry Rahmat Ali and Mohammad Ali Jinnah.21 The Lahore Resolution of 1940 and its amended version adopted in New Delhi in April 1946 changed the earlier plurality of states to become the demand for a single state.22 Statements by the Quaid-i-Azam and Quaid-i-Millat, Liaquat Ali Khan, on the concept of the new state as they visualized it to be molded by Islamic principles and values of universal equity.23

 

Some analysts are of the opinion that the Quaid-i-Azam did not have a clear vision of what kind of state Pakistan was meant to be. They quote the famous “secular” part of his address on 11th August 1947 and then quote excerpts from his speech at the Karachi Bar Association on 25th January 1948 wherein he emphasized the Islamic dimensions as being central for the future Constitution. Later, in February 1948 during a radio broadcast to audiences in the USA, he reiterated that the foundational principles for the Constitution and the state would be Islamic.24 As most others do, one sees no contradiction between his view of all citizens, regardless of religion, as being equal in rights and in law, and his avowal of Islamic principles – which also underline exactly the same precept of equality. By affording equality to all faiths – as in ayat 62 in Surah Al-Baqarah, repeated as ayat 65 in Surah Al Maidah, of the Holy Quran25 and as expressed in Misaaq- i-Madina, there is a refreshing secularism at the core of Islam. The Quaid passed away before the 1956 Constitution was adopted and   the first deviations from his vision were codified. So, the buck for   the distortion cannot be passed to the Quaid. Those who came after him are accountable. Even in the 18th Amendment in 2010, the trend deepened when a PPP Government was in office. Because now the Prime Minister, in addition to the President, must also be Muslim. Why are some elements in our beloved nation so apprehensive about   a tiny 3 per cent non-Muslim segment performing the most unlikely feat of being elected President or Prime Minister? This is paranoia personified.

 

The people shape ideology:

Ideology is also shaped by the actual practice, and the different interpretations of all the preceding sources, texts and amendments. Hard realities of conditions on the ground exert an  impact. How  the people live and inter-act with each other, in social, economic and cultural contexts, in how they treat – or maltreat – the land and whether or not they respect Nature and the environment, as they are enjoined to do by the Holy Quran.26 Whether the people ensure the principle of balance (“tawazun” and “ meezan”) in all vital aspects of their lives, be it family size, girl-children’s rights to education, or whether social reality outside the mosques reflects the equality and egalitarianism that is obligatory inside the mosques. Whether the enormous compassion and generous gifting of charity by the people is matched with diligent rendering of direct income taxes payable to the state. Whether citizens elect individuals of integrity and competence or whether they remain vulnerable to the pulls of ethnicity, tribe, propaganda or populism.

 

Though some institutions of the state may promote a certain interpretation of ideology, it does not necessarily follow that the people at large will unanimously accept that interpretation. Some segments may do so for some time. But it is the people themselves at large who determine – who have the responsibility to determine – whether a particular interpretation of ideology or religion is acceptable, or worth applying in practice.

 

Islamization only partially accepted:

In the case of Zia ul Haq’s Islamization campaign to distort the original core of Islam for his own personal prolongation in power, certain features that gave ideology an orthodox, ritualistic dimension seem to have survived his death in 1988 after 11 years in office. While his tenure fostered showy piety, ritualism and religiosity, in actual practice the vast bulk of the population in 2020 remains moderate, level-headed and pluralist in the true Sufi tradition.

 

Despite the accentuation of sectarian strife and violent extremism during and after Zia ul Haq’s exit, the people have never given majority votes to religion-based or extremist political parties. In all the eight elections held since Zia ul Haq’s demise – 1988, 1990, 1993, 1997, 2002, 2008, 2013, 2018 – over a period of 32 years, the people of Pakistan have demonstrated exceptional maturity.27 They compartmentalize their religious beliefs and practices separate from their political preferences. By doing so, the people illustrate the importance of their own role in shaping how ideology shapes their conduct. (In 2002, the religion-based alliance MMA won a majority in the NWFP – now KPK – but this was a one-off, freak case that may well have been engineered. The MMA has never repeated that win.)

 

Because Zia ul Haq was an Army General and the Army continues to exert a covert and even visible influence on aspects of public affairs, it is relevant to note that not a single Army Chief after Zia ul Haq – there have been eight of them between 1988 and 2020 – has emulated his predecessor or shown any inclination to misuse religion for personal benefit or ideological exploitation. Not even Pervez Musharraf, the only one of those eight Chiefs who also became President and was in power for 9 years, tried to imitate Zia ul Haq. In fact, in virtually every sense, Pervez Musharraf was the exact opposite of that particular predecessor: except for the desire to retain power. The nature of the country›s ideology is so sound and strong that it survives and evolves through both military dictators and elected despots.

 

In theory, the Constitutionally mandated Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) serves as the doctrinal custodian of the country’s ideology.28 Fortunately, however, unlike Iran post-1979, where an unelected supreme leader, the senior-most Ayatullah is empowered to veto an elected Parliament,29 in Pakistan’s case, the CII serves only as an advisory body. An elected Parliament alone has the power to accept, amend, re-consider or reject the CII’s opinion on a given issue. The process of ijtehaad – which can be defined as the application of new knowledge to how this new knowledge can be used and reconciled with the fundamental principles of Islam – is a process that ensures the abiding vigour of a faith-related ideology. This is a process to which, simultaneously, Parliament, the Provincial legislatures, the Supreme Court and the High Courts, the CII, ulema, civil society, academia – including both civil and military universities – public discourse, the media and informed citizens, all should and do often contribute.

 

Sometimes — a stalemate:

Inevitably, there are tensions. There is resistance to accepting new interpretations of conventional’ codes and edicts. One on-going, unresolved issue is the stalemate on prevention of early child marriages. Whereas the Sindh Provincial Assembly enacted a new law prohibiting marriage of children, including girl-children before the age of 18 years,30 the National Assembly’s adoption of a similar law at the Federal level is halted because the religion-based political parties represented in the NA, albeit in small numbers, have been able to freeze discussion on the grounds that the restriction is un-Islamic. Their view is that if a girl attains puberty before 18 years, she is, by Islamic custom, eligible to be married. They cite examples from history to advance their views. On the other hand, Pakistan has ratified the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.31 This specifies that adulthood begins only after 18 years of age. This example typifies the regrettable tendency of non-religion-based political parties that enjoy the majority in the legislatures to refrain from forcefully confronting and overcoming the regressive approach of obscurantists, a trait referred to earlier in this text.

 

No ideology is an island:

No nation-state – even a brave Cuba only 90 miles from the US coastline yet defiant of US hegemony for over 60 years – is an island. Nor is any ideology a permanent island. Be it in terms of exposure to new precepts, new influences, new technologies that assume global recognition nor in terms of inter-dependence for trade and exchanges, all nation-states and their respective ideologies take note of, or respond to change in various forms. Even North Korea, perhaps the most isolated, insulated state on the planet today, is reliant on, and has to respect China’s views and interests because its large neighbour is its main lifeline for vital supplies.

 

Even as it retains some fundamental elements, the ideology of Pakistan continues to be shaped, for better and sometimes for the worse by institutions as also by individuals, be they civil and political or be they military. Every citizen too plays a role by deciding which and to what extent a feature of ideology affects her or his life.

 

To conclude, six factors will enable our ideology to be dynamic and purposeful. They are: the pursuit of knowledge; the promotion of social justice; the strengthening of democracy in its widest, and not only its electoral sense; balanced growth in the context of population and resources; the end of primitive practices that victimize women and girls in particular; and robust, unceasing ijtehaad.

 

References

1958. H. Erikson, “Young man Luther — a study in psycho-analysis and history”, Norton, London, 1958. p.22.

Mihailo Markovic, “The Contemporary Marx “, Spokesman Books, 1974, 59.

Asghar Ali Engineer, “Theory and Practice of the Islamic State “, Vanguard Books, Lahore, 1985, p.150.

Fazlur Rahman, “Islam”, Islamic Research Institute, Karachi, 111.

Fred Halliday and Hamza Alavi, “State and Ideology in the Middle East and Pakistan “, Macmillan Education, 1988.

Oxford English Dictionary, Oxford University Press,

Khaliq Ahmed Nizami, “Religion and Politics in India in the 13^th century D.”, Aligarh University, cited by Ahmed Abdulla, “An Observation: Perspective of Pakistan”, Tanzeem Publishers, Karachi, 1987. p.76.

Ahmed Abdulla, “An Observation: Perspective on Pakistan”, Tanzeem Publishers, Karachi, 1987, 53-54.

Ibid.

Maulana Abul Kamal Azad, “India wins Freedom” (complete version), Orient Longman, 1988. p.164 -190.

Ibid.  p.198.

K.K. Aziz, “Rahmat Ali — a biography “. Vanguard Books, 1987. p.82.

Jaswant Singh. “Jinnah-India-Partition-Independence “. Rupa & Co. 2009. p. 51.

Fred Halliday and Hamza Alavi. “State and Ideology in the Middle East and Pakistan”. Macmillan Education Ltd. 1988. 79.

Ibid. p.64-111.

Pakistan Bureau of “A Panorama of 50 years of Pakistan”. Islamabad. 1997. p.13.

Hamid Khan. “Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan “. Oxford University Press. 2001. 104.

Constitution of the People’s Republic of First line of text and Article 2 A.

Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. Articles 8 to 40.

K.K. Aziz, “A History of the Idea of Pakistan”. Vanguard Books. 1987, 1997. p.671-694.

Dr Javid Iqbal. “Ideology of Pakistan”. Ferozsons Ltd. 1971. p.118-119 K.K.Aziz . “Rahmat Ali — a biography”. Vanguard Books. 1987. p.82-83. Shariful-Mujahid. “Ideological Foundations of Pakistan”. International Islamic University, Islamabad. 2nd revised edition. 2012. p.43-73. 96-101.

S.Pirzada, ( Ed.) “Foundations of Pakistan” First edition, Volume II, p.478-479, National Institute of Historical Research, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad.

H.Saiyid. “Mohammad Ali Jinnah: A Political Study”. Elite Publishers. College edition, 1970. p. 285-6. Shariful Mujahid. “Ideological Foundations of Pakistan”. International Islamic University, Islamabad. 2012. p.140-144. p.155- 226.

Shariful Mujahid and Liaquat Merchant, Editors, Quotes from the Quaid, Lightstone Publishers, 2019, p.36-37.

Holy Quran. English translation by Abdullah Yusuf Ali. Saba Islamic Media. p.31-32 and p.145.

Ibid. Surah 55-Al Rahman. Ayats 7-9. p.663.

Election Commission of Pakistan publications/website

Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Article 230.

Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Article 110.

Sindh Early Marriage Restraint Act, 2014.

UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1990, UNICEF website.